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NOTES
EAVESDROPPING UNDER THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS
At common law, eavesdropping' was an indictable offense.2 Evi-
dence obtained by eavesdropping was nevertheless admissible in crim-
inal prosecutions against the person from whom it was thus illegally
obtained.3 This result followed from the rule then prevailing that if
evidence was relevant to the issues at trial and otherwise admissible,
the party against whom the evidence was admitted could not object
because of the illegality by which it was obtained.' Within the last
quarter of a century, however, grave problems have arisen in criminal
prosecutions as to whether eavesdropping violates an accused's rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
This note will discuss the constitutional aspects of eavesdropping.
The issues can be resolved into two basic problems which are only
incidentally interrelated. The first problem is whether, and under
what circumstances, eavesdropping by federal officers may be a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. The second problem is whether, and
under what circumstances, evidence obtained by state law enforce-
ment officers by eavesdropping must be excluded, as a matter of due
process, in a state criminal proceeding against the one from whom the
evidence was obtained.5
EAVESDROPPING UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
With the invention of electronic devices, law enforcement officers
now can obtain evidence not only by eavesdropping but also by means
unknown to the writers of the Fourth Amendment who sought by the
Amendment to protect persons against "all invasions on the part of
the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life."8
1. "Eaves-droppers ... (are] such as listen under walls or windows, or the
eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous
and mischievous tales... ." 4 BL Coml. *168.
2. State v. Davis, 139 N.C. 547, 51 S.E. 897 (1905); State v. Pennington, 40
Tenn. (3 Head) 299 (1859).
3. Schoborg v. United States, 264 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1920) (federal trial; evi-
dence obtained by private citizens) ; Brindley v. State, 193 Ala. 43, 69 So. 536
(1915) ; People v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166 (1874) ; State v. Minneapolis Milk Co., 124
Minn. 34, 144 N.W. 417 (1913).
4. "The Court will not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully
or unlawfully, nor will it form an issue, to determine that question." 1 GnmNLrAP,
EVXENC22 § 254 (a) (Lewis' ed. 1899). See 8 WroRou, EviDENCS § 2183 (3d ed.
1940).
6. inasmuch as the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments apply, respectively,
to the federal and state governments and their agents, this note will not cover
the problems of eavesdropping when committed by private citizens.
6. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886).
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In 1928, in Olmstead v. United States,7 the Supreme Court of the
United States first met the problem of whether wiretapping, an elec-
tro-mechanical means of eavesdropping, was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. During a period of nearly five months, federal agents,
by means of taps on the telephone wires leading to the homes of four
of the defendants and to the office of one of them, acquired incriminat-
ing evidence which was subsequently used to convict the defendants of
conspiring to violate the National Prohibition Act. The agents made
the wire taps without the knowledge or consent of the defendants, and
also without trespassing on any defendant's property. By a five to
four decision the Court held that wiretapping did not constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure, saying that the very wording of the
Fourth Amendment shows that the proscribed conduct is the search
of material things, such as one's person, house, papers or effects.,, Mr.
Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the majority of the Court, said:
The Fourth Amendment does not forbid what was done here.
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants....
The language of the Amendment cannot be extended and ex-
panded to include telephone wires reaching to the whole world
from the defendants' house or office. 9
He refused to follow the suggestion of Mr. Justice Clarke in Gouled v.
United States", that the Fourth Amendment should be liberally con-
strued to accomplish the purpose of the framers of the Constitution
and to "... prevent stealthy encroachment upon... the rights secured
by [the Fourth Amendment] ... by well-intentioned but mistakenly
over-zealous executive officers."1 By the majority's view, then, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment was not to be afforded to conver-
sations which could be secretly overheard by government officials with-
out an actual and unlawful entry.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a vigorous dissent,12 thought that the
Fourth Amendment should be liberally construed, reasoning that
"[c] lauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific
abuses of power, must have a ... capacity of adaptation to a changing
world."'13 After noting that recent inventions had made it possible for
law enforcement officers to obtain evidence by means far more effec-
tive than by physical force on the person of the suspect, he pointed out
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
8. Id. at 464.
9. Id. at 464, 465.
10. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
11. Id. at 304.
12. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928). Justice Brandeis
thought the majority was unduly literal in their construction of the Fourth
Amendment.
13. Id. at 472.
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that scientific progress was not likely to stop with merely furnishing
law enforcement agents with means by which secretly to obtain the
expressed thoughts of individuals and he predicted that future "[a] d-
vances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of explor-
ing unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions114 The Fourth Amend-
ment furnishes protection against such invasions of individual pri-
vacy, he said, quoting with approval from Boyd v. United States:1r
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property ... 1
'Justice Brandeis further maintained that the framers of the Constitu-
tion conferred on the people a right to be let alone, not only as to
person and property, but also in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. He considered the Government's un-
authorized invasion, by any means, of this fundamental right of pri-
vacy to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.17 He did not con-
sider that a trespass to property constituted an essential element in
the definition of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Six years after the Olmstead case, Congress passed the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.18 The Supreme Court interpreted Section 605 of
this statute as requiring the exclusion of evidence gained by wire-
tapping.,9 This interpretation, requiring the exclusion of wire-tap
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
15. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). This was the first case wherein the Supreme
Court construed the Fourth Amendment. Lord Camden's judgment in Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765), the classic English case on unrea-
sonable search and seizure, was reviewed and relied upon by the Court in its
opinion.
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
17. Id. at 473.
18. 48 STAT. 1064, 1104 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946) provides in part that:[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any commu-
nication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person....
[Italics added.]
48 STAT. 1064, 1100 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1946) provides a penalty for inten-
tional violation of the above section by any person.
19. The Act was interpreted for the first time by the Court in Nardone v.
United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), which construed the words "no person" to
include federal agents and the inhibition on communication to "any person" as
including testimony in a court as to the contents of an intercepted message. The
second Nardone case, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), extended the rule of the first Nardone
case by holding that evidence procured by the use of knowledge acquired from
conversations illegally intercepted was inadmissible. In 1952, the Court in
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) decided that § 605 of the Federal
Communications Act did not prevent telephone conversations intercepted in
violation of the Act from being used as evidence in a criminal proceeding in a
state court. Compare the Schwartz case with Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179
(1954), wherein the Court said that 52 STAT. 943 (1938), 18 U.S.C. § 3486
1946), which provides that "[n]o testimony given by a witness . . . before any
conmittee of either House ... shall be used as evidence in any criminal pro-
ceeding against him in any court ... ," prevents a state court from using testi-
mony so acquired. The difference between the interpretation of the Communications
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evidence, did not, of course, alter the holding of the Otmtead case on
the constitutional point.
The problem of whether eavesdropping by government agents was
a violation of the Fourth Amendment was again presented in qoldmna
v. United States.2° Federal agents gained access to the office of one of
the several individuals suspected of conspiring to violate the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Unknown to this person, the agents installed a hidden
microphone in his office with a wire extending into an adjoining office
to which earphones were attached so that a conference planned by the
conspirators could be overheard. The microphone failed to work but
the agents were able to overhear the conference by means of a detecta-
phone l which they placed against the wall separating their office from
that of the conspirators. The evidence thus obtained was used to con-
vict the conspirators of violating the Bankruptcy Act. In affirming
their conviction, the Court held that the use of the detectaphone by the
government agents was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
What was heard by its use was not made illegal by the trespass or un-
lawful entry of the agents into the office to install the microphone,
since the trespass in installing the microphone was unrelated to the
use of the detectaphone. The majority of the Court intimated that if
the microphone had been used, however, its use might have violated
the Fourth Amendment because the original trespass committed by the
agents in installing the microphone could have been a continuing tres-
pass accompanying its use.22
The defendants urged that their case be distinguished from the
Olmstead case because in the latter case the Court had said that a per-
son speaking into a telephone intends to project his voice beyond the
limits of his home or office and consequently assumes the risk that he
may be overheard. In the instant case, however, since the defendant
was talking in his own office with the intent that the conversation be
confined within that room, he could not be assumed to have taken the
risk of someone overhearing his conversation by use of a sensitive re-
ceiver and powerful amplifier. Mr. Justice Roberts said for the major-
ity, however, that this distinction was without a reasonable or logical
Act and the statute involved in the Adams case can be explained by the fact that
Congress did not intend by the Communications Act to promulgate a rule of
evidence for use in the state courts, whereas the immunity statute was to apply
to all courts. The use of wire tap evidence in the federal and Missouri courts is
discussed in Note, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 340. For a discussion of the problem of the
Congressional immunity legislation subsequently involved in the Adams case, see
Note, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 313. For a discussion of the Adams case itself, see
1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 342.
20. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
21. A detectaphone is a sensitive receiver capable of picking up sounds in-
audible to the human ear and amplifying them so that they can be understood.
22. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942).
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basis and was too technical to be drawn in applying the Fourth
Amendment.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, -3
agreed that there was no distinction in principle between the facts in
the Olmstead case and those in the instant case, but thought that the
Olmstead case should be overruled on the basis of Justice Brandeis'
dissenting opinion in that case.
Mr. Justice Murphy, in a separate dissent," agreed with the major-
ity that there was no physical entry in the case, but said that, because
of scientific advances, a physical entry was no longer necessary for
a search of one's home or office, and that a person's privacy could now
be invaded by indirect means equally as offensive as the direct methods
which inspired the Fourth Amendment. He refused to construe the
search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment as was done in
Olmstead because he felt this construction was too~narrow and literal
and that anomalous results followed from such a construction. He
thought it was a strange result which protected the most mundane
thoughts recorded on paper, but allowed the revelation of the most
intimate or confidential thoughts uttered in the privacy of one's quar-
ters. Justice Murphy also thought that, even if the Olmstead case were
not overruled, the use of a detectaphone to overhear a conversation in
a home or private office was an invasion and search of private quar-
ters. He believed that the application of the detectaphone to the wall
was a sufficient trespass by the federal agents on the property of the
suspects to constitute an unreasonable search as defined in the major-
ity opinion in Olmstead.
That a trespass to the property of a suspect by police is an essential
element in the definition of an unreasonable search and seizure in the
eavesdropping cases was high-lighted in the recent case of On Lee v.
United States.25 There the defendant was on bail pending trial for
violation of the federal narcotics laws. Chin Poy, a former acquaint-
ance of the defendant, entered the defendant's laundry and engaged
him in conversation, during which the latter made self-incriminating
statements. Unknown to the defendant, Chin Poy was acting as an
undercover agent for the Bureau of Narcotics and had concealed on
his person a small radio transmitter. Lee, another federal agent, was
stationed outside the store and by means of a radio receiver was able
to hear the conversation. 28
23. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 136 (1942).
24. Ibid.
25. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
26. Lee also understood the conversation between Chin Poy and the defendant
even though it was in Chinese. Although the Court did not discuss the problem
in the instant case, it would appear difficult to find that the defendant had
assumed the risk of being overheard, as the Court found the defendant in the
Otmstead case had done.
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By a five to four decision,' the Supreme Court held that the conduct
of Chin Poy and Lee did not constitute an unreasonable search and
seizure. Defendant had sought to bring himself within the dictum of
the Goldman case which had intimated that the installation and use of
the microphone by federal agents in that case might have constituted
an unreasonable search and seizure because of the trespass committed
in its installation. The Court, speaking through Justice Jackson, said
that the defendant could not raise the question left undecided in the
Goldman case because here no trespass was committed. The Court
said that Chin Poy had committed no trespass because he had entered
the place of business with the consent, if not by the implied invitation,
of the defendant; the majority rejected the defendant's claim that
Chin Poy's entrance was a trespass by reason that consent to his entry
was obtained by fraud. The Supreme Court had previously decided
that the doctrine of trespass ab initio is not applicable in interpreting
the Fourth Amendment ;28 therefore, no trespass by Chin Poy on that
ground could be material. The Court also rejected the argument that
Lee, who was able to overhear conversations inside the laundry by
means of the radio transmitter and receiver, was a trespasser. The
majority said that the trespass problem left undecided in the Goldman
case would be before the Court only in the case of physical entry,
either by force, by unwilling submission to authority, or without any
express or implied consent. It was also decided that those cases29 hold-
ing that there was an unreasonable search and seizure where tangible
property had been unlawfully seized by government agents although
entry was by subterfuge or fraud rather than by force were not perti-
nent in cases where electro-mechanical instruments were used to over-
hear conversation, "at least where access to the listening post was not
obtained by illegal means.' ' o
Justice Frankfurter again adopted Justice Brandeis' dissent in the
Olmtead case and in his own dissenting opinion31 stated that the Oli-
stead case should be overruled because "[the circumstances of the
present case show how the rapid advances of science are made avail-
able for that police intrusion into our private lives against which the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution was set on guard."3 2 He felt
27. Four separate dissenting opinions were filed.
28. McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927). Under the doctrine of
trespass ab initio, one who enters upon land by legal authority and seizes property
or makes an arrest but subsequently engages in tortious conduct is held liable as
a trespasser from the beginning. By a fiction, his abuse of authority relatesback to his original act and makes it unlawful. PRossE, TORTS 157 (1941). It
seems there could be no trespass ab initio in this case because Chin Poy's en-
trance was by private permission, and not by legal authority.
29. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. '48 (1951); Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921).
30. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952).
31. Id. at 758.
32. Id. at 759.
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that for the Court to sanction such "dirty business" would make "for
lazy and not alert law enforcement."3 3
Mr. Justice Douglas, who had been with the majority of the Court
in the Goldman case, joined the dissenters3' in On Lee to say that he
was wrong in the Goldman case and, after quoting extensively from
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead, stated that "the nature of the
instrument that science or engineering develops is not important. The
controlling, the decisive factor is the invasion of privacy against the
command of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.!"
Mr. Justice Burton, dissenting," stated that the protection of the
Fourth Amendment should be extended to intangibles, including
spoken words, and not limited to the seizure of tangible things. Going
further, he was of the opinion that the place where the effects are
seized should be the test in determining what constitutes a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Since here the words were picked up from
within the defendant's "house," which is the place protected by the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, Jus-
tice Burton thought that Lee's conduct was the same as if he had,
without a search warrant or consent, entered into the defendant's shop
and there overheard the conversation. By this analysis, it is possible
to find the trespass or unlawful entry into the defendant's house neces-
sary to make the action by the federal agents an unreasonable search
as defined by the majority of the Court.
The OZmstead case intimated that the protection of the Fourth
Amendment was to be afforded only to material things. Eavesdrop-
ping by wiretapping, the mere abstraction of a voice from wires which
are not part of a person's house, therefore, could not fall within the
prohibition of the Fourth Amendment. In the Goldman case, the Court
indicated, without deciding, that eavesdropping could be an unreason-
able search and seizure if coupled with a trespass. The On Lee de-.
cision left open the question of whether eavesdropping, when coupled
with a trespass, is an unreasonable search and seizure, for no trespass
was found in that case. The decision of the Court, however, again in-
dictated that if there had been a trespass to property, coupled with the
eavesdropping, the Fourth Amendment may have been violated. The
Go e man and On Lee cases impliedly limit the dictum of the Olmstead
case to the extent that the latter case intimated that there can be an
unreasonable search and seizure only of material things. The On Lee
case, however, also indicates that the Court will be reluctant to find
the trespass necessary for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
33. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 761 (1952).
34. Id. at 762.
35. Id. at 765.
36. Ibid. Justice Frankfurter concurred with Justice Burton's dissenting
opinion.
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EAVESDROPPING UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The states have the primary responsibility of enforcement in the
field of criminal justice, but with the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment the Supreme Court acquired the power 37 to insure that no
person be deprived by a state of "life, liberty or property without due
process of law."'' While the Supreme Court was interpreting the
Fourth Amendment as applied in the federal courts, it also re-defined,
in Wolf v. Colorado9 and Rochin v. California,40 the Fourteenth
Amendment's effect on state criminal proceedings.
Evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure
by federal agents is inadmissible in the federal courts in criminal pro-
ceedings against the person from whom it was taken, and the trial
court's failure to sustain the defendant's objection to the admission of
such evidence is grounds for reversal. This was the rule established
in Weeks v. United States, " and subsequently followed in criminal pro-





37. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1946) provides in part that:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court ...
where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution ... of . . . the United States.
38. Apart from permitting Congress to use criminal sanctions as a means for
carrying into execution powers granted to it, the Constitution left the domain
of criminal justice to the States. The Constitution, including the Bill of
Rights, placed no restriction upon the power of the States to consult solely
their own notions of policy in formulating penal codes and in administering
them, excepting only that they were forbidden to pass any "Bill of Attainder"
or "ex post facto Law," Constitution of the United States, Art. I, § 10.
This freedom of action remained with the States until 1868. The Fourteenth
Amendment severely modified the situation. It did so not by changing the
distribution of power as between the States and the central government but
merely by restricting the freedom theretofore possessed by the States in the
making and the enforcement of their criminal law.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412(1945).
39. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
40. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
41. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
42. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74 (1949); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948);
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 580 (1948); Nathanson v. United States, 290
U.S. 41 (1933); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Taylor v. United
States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Gambino v.
United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Private detectives may use methods to
obtain evidence not open to officers of the law. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465(1921). See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 492 (1944); McGuire v.
United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927). Cf. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74(1949). The defendant who objects to the admission of evidence must claim some
proprietary or possessory interest in that which was unlawfully searched or
seized. See, e.g., Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1952);
Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932). See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
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In Wolf v. Colorado," the problem before the Supreme Court was
whether a conviction by a state court violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment solely because evidence admitted at the
trial would have been inadmissible in a federal criminal proceeding
for the reason that the evidence was obtained by an unreasonable
search and seizure.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority of the Court,
answered this question in the negative. In determining what limita-
tions were to be imposed upon state courts in their criminal proceed-
ings, the court adhered to the doctrine of Palko v. ConnecticUt." In
that case Mr. Justice Cardozo had stated that the rights of the individ-
ual to be protected from infringement by the states by the Due Process
Clause were those which were "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."45 Although the Due Process Clause does not incorporate all
of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution,40 Justice Frank-
furter said in the Wolf case that it does include the protection against
unreasonable searches because "[t]he security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment-is basic to free society."4r But he held that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not require that the rule of the Weeks case be
applied to the states through the Due Process Clause. He said that
the rule of the Weeks case was a rule of evidence and procedure de-
veloped by the Supreme Court for use in the federal courts and "was
not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment" nor was it "based on legislation expressing Congressional
policy in the enforcement of the Constitution." 48 Thus, although it was
25, 30-31 (1949); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1941). Cf.
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). But the defendant is not entitled to
the benefit of the Weeks rule when he commits perjury in testifying in his own
behalf. This evidence may be used, however, solely for impeachment. Walder
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). For an analysis of the problem in the
Weeks rule see 4 WIGMOmn, EvDuNmNC § 2184 (8d ed. 1940).
43. 338 tjS. 25 (1949).
44. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Palko contended that whatever is forbidden by the
Fifth Amendment is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment also, and that a
state could not violate that provision of the Fifth Amendment which prohibits
double jeopardy without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court rejected this contention, and held that the double jeopardy
to which Connecticut had subjected Palko was not violative of the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice. Justice Cardozo said for the Court that those
"... immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the
specific pledges of particular amendments.. ." and which "... have been found
to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.. .," have, ".. through the Four-
teenth Amendment, become valid as against the states ...." Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937).
45. Id. at 325.
46. Palko v. Connecticut, note 43 supra (double jeopardy); Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (privilege against self-incrimination); Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (privilege against self-incrimination); Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (indictment by grand jury).
47. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
48. Id. at 28.
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stated in Wolf v. Colorado that, through the Fourteenth Amendment,
the individual has a right to be protected from an unreasonable
search and seizure by state officers, his remedy for its violation need
not be the exclusion of evidence secured by such means in a criminal
action against him by the state. The states, at their discretion, may
refuse to apply the Weeks doctrine as a rule of evidence in their
criminal proceedings.
Three dissenting opinions were filed in the Wolf case, agreeing that
the principle of the Fourth Amendment was to be included within the
protection afforded by the Fourteenth, but disagreeing with the ma-
jority holding that evidence obtained by state police in violation of
the principle of the Fourth Amendment could be admitted in a state
court and employed to convict the accused from whom it was thus
obtained. The dissenters thought that the only effective means to
prevent the violation of the principle of the Fourth Amendment was
to exclude the evidence secured by its violation in the state, as well
as in the federal courts.4 -
In Rochin v. California,50 the Court again was faced with the prob-
lem of the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in a state crimi-
nal proceeding. Suspecting that Rochin was selling narcotics, state
officers entered his home without a search warrant and forced their
way into a bedroom occupied by Rochin and his wife. Lying on a bed-
side table were two capsules. Rochin quickly swallowed them, despite
forcible attempts by the officers to remove them from his mouth. The
officers then took him to a hospital where an emetic was pumped into
his stomach against his will. He vomited two capsules which were
found to contain morphine. These were admitted into evidence in a
state court and used to convict him of violating a state law forbidding
the possession of morphine.
On appeal to the Supreme Court the state court conviction was re-
versed because it was obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause.
Justice Frankfurter, again writing the opinion of the Court, said that:
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause "inescap-
ably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the
whole course of the proceedings.., in order to ascertain whether
they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express
the notions of justice of English-speaking people even toward
those charged with the most heinous offenses.' ' [Italics added.]
Under this test he concluded that, in the instant case, the entire pro-
ceedings by which Rochin's conviction was obtained was "conduct
that shocks the conscience," offensive even to hardened sensibilities.
49. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 40 (1949).
50. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
51. Id. at 169, quoting in part from his opinion in Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401, 416 (1945).
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The Court said these methods were "too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation."2
The Wolf case was not mentioned in the Rochin case although the
conduct of the state officers in the Rochin case constituted an unrea-
sonable search and seizure. In the Wolf case, state officers used no
physical violence on the defendant; in the Rochin case they did. The
conviction in the Wolf case was not obtained in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment; the conviction in the Roehin case was. The
distinguishing factor, then, between the two cases would appear to be
that the officers in the Rochin case employed physical violence, a stom-
ach pump, upon the accused to secure the evidence subsequently used
to convict him.
That physical coercion on the person of the accused is the distin-
guishing factor between these two cases is evidenced by the recent
case of Irvine v. California," In the Irvine case, state law enforcement
officers, suspecting Irvine of violating a state anti-gambling law, en-
tered his home during his absence and installed a microphone con-
nected by means of a wire to earphones in a nearby garage. Agents
were stationed in the garage to listen in on Irvine's conversations in
his home by means of this device. Five days later, the officers again
entered Irvine's home during his absence and moved the microphone
to the bedroom where Irvine and his wife slept. After allowing the
microphone to remain in the bedroom for twenty days, the officers
again entered the home and moved the microphone to a closet and con-
tinued to eavesdrop on Irvine's conversations. The police did all of
these things without a search warrant and without the knowledge or
consent of Irvine. Incriminating statements made by Irvine during
this period and overheard by means of the device were admitted into
evidence in a state court over his objection and were used to convict
him on a charge of gambling.
Relying on the Wolf case, the Supreme Court affirmed Irvine's con-
viction in a five to four decision. Mr. Justice Jackson, who had written
the majority opinion in On Lee v. United States,54 also wrote for the
majority in the instant case.5 He said the use of the microphone was
the same, legally, as if an eavesdropper had been hidden in the house to
obtain the evidence. The methods employed in the Irvine case, if used
by federal agents, would have violated the Fourth Amendment and the
evidence thus secured would have been inadmissible in the federal
52. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
53. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
54. See text supported by notes 27-30 supra.
55. Justice Jackson wrote the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice
Warren and two other justices concurred. Justice Clark, in a separate opinion,
concurred in the result.
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courts." Although the Wolf case said that the principle of the Fourth
Amendment was to be embodied within the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that case refused to impose upon the states
the rule of the Week& case requiring the exclusion of evidence in the
federal courts when secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The majority held that the holding in the Wolf case was decisive and
that the evidence which the state officers obtained with the microphone
was admissible.
Irvine sought to bring his case within the rule of the Roehin case,
but this effort was rejected by the majority of the Court on the ground
that the element of physical coercion, present in that case, was lacking
here. Justice Jackson said: "However obnoxious are the facts in the
case before us, they do not involve coercion, violence or brutality to
the person, but rather a trespass to property, plus eavesdropping."'
Mr. Justice Clark concurred with the majority,-8 but said that if
he had been present when the Wolf case was decided, he would have
applied the rule of the Weeks case to the states. It should be noted
that, although the Irvine decision was five-four, only one of the four
dissenting justices thought that the Wolf case should be overruled.
Thus, even if Justice Clark had voted with the dissenters, the result
would not have been an overruling of the Wolf case but rather a find-
ing that the conviction had been secured in violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause within the meaning of the Rockin case. Justice Clark did
not feel that the facts of the instant case fell within the doctrine of
the Rochin. case, however, as he thought that the actions of the state
officers here constituted only an unreasonable search and seizure. He
therefore concurred with Justice Jackson's opinion that this case
fell within the doctrine of the Wolf case.
Justice Frankfurter dissented, saying ... Wolf did not and could
not decide that as long as relevant evidence adequately supports a
conviction, it is immaterial how such evidence was acquired.",; He
thought that Irvine's conviction should be set aside on the basis of the
Rochin case. He rejected the contention that the presence or absence
of physical violence is determinative of the applicability of the Rochin
56. Justice Jackson and Chief Justice Warren thought that the clerk of the
Court should be directed to furnish the Attorney General with a copy of the rec-
ord and opinion in the case so that the state officers could be prosecuted in a
federal court for violating 62 STAT. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. 1952),
which provides that whoever, under color of any law, willfully subjects any resi-
dent of any state to the deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution shall
be fined or imprisoned. Irvine might also have been able to bring a civil action
against the officers for damages. The use of a hidden microphone is an invasion
of the right to privacy. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App.
92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).
57. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954).
58. Id. at 138.
59. Id. at 143.
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doctrine. In his opinion, the methods employed here were as shocking
to the conscience as those in the Rochi case. It was his view that
there was more than a mere unreasonable search and seizure involved,
and that the methods used gave "... . a more powerful and offensive
control over the Irvines' life than a single, limited physical trespass."00
Justice Frankfurter concluded that "[o] bservance of due process has
to do not with questions of guilt or innocence but the mode by which
guilt is ascertained" 1 and that
[W] hen a conviction is secured by methods which offend elemen-
tary standards of justice, the victim of such methods may invoke
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment because that
Amendment guarantees him a trial fundamentally fair in the
sense in which that idea is incorporated in due process02
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a separate dissent 3 reiterating the views he
expressed in the Wolf case, thought that the only effective remedy to
prevent unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers was by
excluding evidence so obtained and that the rule of the Weeks case
should be extended to apply to state criminal proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment, forbidding unreasonable searches and
seizures, does not extend so far as to forbid a federal officer to listen
to a private conversation. It is believed, however, that the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure would forbid a forcible official
intrusion even though the intrusion was not followed by any actual
rummaging. If federal agents, then, commit a trespass on the private
quarters of a suspect to gain access to a listening post, the Court
would very probably find this action to be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The information acquired by the federal officers in the
latter situation could never be used, under the Weeks rule, in a federal
prosecution against the person from whom it was taken. Wiretapping
does not violate the Fourth Amendment and therefore does not fall
within the ban of the Weeks rule; but the Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the Communications Act to require the exclusion of such
evidence.
The Supreme Court said in the Wolf case that the "security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police" is "enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause."64 But the Court
there held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the ex-
clusion of evidence so obtained. The state will violate the rights of a
person under the Fourteenth Amendment, accordingly, if it, in order
60. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 145 (1954).
61. Id at 148.
62. Ibid.
63. Id. at 149.
64. Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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to eavesdrop on his conversations, also commits a trespass upon his
private quarters to gain access to the listening post; still, the infor-
mation is admissible against him in a state prosecution. This result
was obtained in the Irvine case by following the principle in the Wolf
case that, although state officers obtained the evidence by means which
the Fourteenth Amendment condemned, it did not follow that the
Amendment forbids its use as evidence.
The wisdom of the decision in the Irvine case remains in question.
It is difficult to determine whether the eavesdropping committed by
the state officers in the Irvine case falls within the principles of the
Rochin decision or is merely an unreasonable search. The Rochin
doctrine imposes an inherently subjective standard of judgment on the
Court, which will result in the reversal of a conviction when the Court
finds that it was obtained by outrageous conduct on the part of the
state officers. The Irvine decision establishes, on the other hand, a
rule of upholding convictions regardless of how offensive the methods
by which they were secured may appear, so long as a physical assault
on the person is not employed.
This writer reaches no conclusion on the correctness of the holding
that the methods employed by the state resulting in a conviction in the
Irvine case constituted only an unreasonable search, and that the
admission of evidence so obtained did not violate the Due Process
Clause. The decision is, however, open to question. There are two
basic factors that should be considered in deciding the problems aris-
ing in a situation such as that in the Irvine case. The first is whether
the use of physical violence or coercion in securing evidence to obtain
a conviction is the determinative factor in deciding what "conduct
shocks the conscience ;,,O5 the second is whether it should be. Inasmuch
as the Supreme Court said in the Irvine case that the use of coercion
is the determining factor, it appears that an accused's conviction will
never be reversed by the Court in cases where state officers have ob-
tained, by eavesdropping, the evidence used to convict him, no matter
where the listening post is located or how access to it is acquired, so
long as their actions are not affirmatively sanctioned by the state. This
prediction is, of course, based on the fact that eavesdropping, by
definition, does not involve coercion or physical violence. The question
remains, however, whether the use of physical violence or coercion by
state officers in securing evidence should be the criterion in deciding
what conduct violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. RICHARD C. BEARD
65. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the opinion of the Court in both Wolf v.
Colorado and Rochin v. California, the facts of which cases led to the distinction
seized on by the majority, dissented in the Irvine case because he thought that
the use of physical coercion or violence is not the determinative factor in deciding
what conduct by state officers violates due process. See text at notes 59-61 supra.
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